Voluntary Turnover and Job Performance: Curvilinearity and the Moderating Influences of Salary Growth, Promotions, and Labor Demand by Gerhart, Barry  A. et al.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
CAHRS Working Paper Series Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies (CAHRS) 
August 1995 
Voluntary Turnover and Job Performance: Curvilinearity and the 
Moderating Influences of Salary Growth, Promotions, and Labor 
Demand 
Barry A. Gerhart 
Cornell University 
John W. Boudreau 
Cornell University 
Charlie O. Trevor 
Cornell University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies 
(CAHRS) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAHRS Working Paper Series by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Voluntary Turnover and Job Performance: Curvilinearity and the Moderating 
Influences of Salary Growth, Promotions, and Labor Demand 
Abstract 
In this study we investigated the relation between job performance and voluntary employee turnover for 
5,143 exempt employees in a single firm in the petroleum industry. As hypothesized, we found support for 
Jackofsky's (1984) curvilinear hypothesis as turnover was higher for low and high performers than it was 
for average performers. Three potential moderators of this curvilinearity were examined in an attempt to 
explain conflicting results in the performance turnover literature and contradictory predictions from 
turnover models. As predicted, pay growth, promotions, and labor demand each differentially influenced 
the turnover patterns of low, average, and high performers. Most notably, paying high performers 
according to their performance predicted substantial decrements in turnover. A utility analysis indicated 
that the benefits of paying high performers according to their performance more than offset the costs 
and that such an approach was a superior strategy when compared to a more egalitarian pay growth 
policy. 
Keywords 
human resource, human, resource, turnover, job, performance, salary, promotion, labor, demand, 
employee, industry, model, pay, perform, cost, promotion 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Gerhart, B., Boudreau, J. W. & Trevor, C. O. (1995). Voluntary turnover and job performance: Curvilinearity 
and the moderating influences of salary growth, promotions, and labor demand (CAHRS Working Paper 
#95-33). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Center for Advanced 
Human Resource Studies. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/223 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/223 
W O R K I N G  P A P E R  S E R I E S
Voluntary Turnover and Job Performance:
Curvilinearity and the Moderating
Influences of Salary Growth,




Working Paper  9 5 – 3 3
CAHRS / Cornell University
187 Ives Hall
Ithaca, NY  14853-3901  USA
Tel.  607 255-9358
www.ilr.cornell.edu/CAHRS/
Advancing the World of Work
Voluntary Turnover and Job Performance                                                                                                                 WP 95-33
Page 1
Voluntary Turnover and Job Performance:
Curvilinearity and the Moderating Influences
of Salary Growth, Promotions, and Labor Demand
Barry Gerhart








Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies
Cornell University
Charlie O. Trevor




This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School. It is
intended to make results of research, conferences, and projects available to others interested in
human resource management in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions.
Voluntary Turnover and Job Performance                                                                                                                 WP 95-33
Page 2
Abstract
 In this study we investigated the relation between job performance and voluntary
employee turnover for 5,143 exempt employees in a single firm in the petroleum industry. As
hypothesized, we found support for Jackofsky's (1984) curvilinear hypothesis as turnover was
higher for low and high performers than it was for average performers. Three potential
moderators of this curvilinearity were examined in an attempt to explain conflicting results in the
performance turnover literature and contradictory predictions from turnover models.  As
predicted, pay growth, promotions, and labor demand each differentially influenced the turnover
patterns of low, average, and high performers. Most notably, paying high performers according
to their performance predicted substantial decrements in turnover.  A utility analysis indicated
that the benefits of paying high performers according to their performance more than offset the
costs and that such an approach was a superior strategy when compared to a more egalitarian
pay growth policy.
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The cost of voluntary employee turnover depends on many factors, including the relative
supply and cost of replacements in either the internal or external labor market, the amount of
training invested in the employee, and the performance level of the employee (Dalton, Todor, &
Krackhardt, 1982; Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Hollenbeck & Williams, 1986). Where replacement
costs are low and average performance of replacements is expected to be high, organizations
can benefit from turnover of poor performers. In contrast, turnover of high performers is more
likely to be dysfunctional for the organization (e.g., Park, Ofori-Dankworth, & Bishop, 1994;
Schwab, 1991). Thus, it is important to identify the conditions under which high performers are
most likely to voluntarily leave the organization.
This is especially true at higher job levels (i.e., salaried employees) of the organization,
where, for several reasons, high performer turnover is more costly than at lower levels. For
instance, because the standard deviation of performance tends to be greater in more complex
jobs (Boudreau, 1992), top performer turnover in higher level jobs would result in greater
performance losses than similar turnover in lower level jobs. Moreover, performance at higher
job levels tends to have a larger impact on firm success and is more difficult and expensive to
replace. Finally, turnover of top performers in higher level jobs may result in the loss of future
leaders of the organization, suggesting that the importance of top performer turnover in the
salaried ranks extends well beyond the short term performance losses associated with such
withdrawal.
Review of the Literature
Theoretical Background
Despite the importance of developing an understanding of the relation between
performance and turnover, theoretical models of voluntary employee turnover often yield no
simple prediction concerning the link with employee performance (McEvoy & Cascio, 1987), and
it is only through a somewhat more complex approach incorporating meaningful contingent
factors that we can apply these models. For example, the March and Simon (1958) model, from
which several other turnover models have been derived, suggests that turnover is a function of
perceived ease of movement and perceived desirability of movement. The predicted
interdependence between turnover, performance, and the ease of movement component is
relatively straightforward. Performance would be expected to have a positive influence on ease
of movement (both actual and perceived), resulting in a higher probability of turnover among
high performers and a positive relation between turnover and performance (Jackofsky, 1984).
Gerhart (1990b) found indirect evidence of the first link of this relationship as cognitive ability,
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which is positively related to job performance (Hunter & Hunter, 1984), had a significant positive
effect on perceived ease of movement.
When considering perceived desirability of movement, however, the expected impact of
performance is less apparent, particularly without information on important contextual factors,
such as the reward system. If the organization has a strong linkage between performance and
pay growth, high performers should feel equitably treated and satisfied, assuming that internal
equity is not compromised by being underpaid relative to the external market (Schwab, 1991).
This satisfaction should contribute to low perceived desirability of movement and less probability
of high performer turnover. In contrast, low performers might be more likely to leave because
they could do better financially in organizations where pay was not tied closely to performance.
Thus the pay for performance link should result in a negative relation between turnover and
performance. When growth in pay is not tied to performance, low performers benefit by being
over-rewarded, high performers are under-rewarded, and we might expect a positive relation
between turnover and performance. The implication then is that the nature of the organization's
reward system is likely to be an important contingency in determining low or high perceived
desirability of movement, and subsequent turnover (Dreher, 1982; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992;
Jackofsky, 1984; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Schwab, 1991; Steers & Mowday, 1981).
Combining the effects of perceived ease of movement and perceived desirability of
movement reveals further model equivocality to be resolved. The net relation between voluntary
turnover and performance might be expected to be positive in cases where the
pay-performance relation is weak because both perceived ease and desirability would be high
for high performers. In contrast, cases where the pay-performance relation is strong offer no
obvious prediction. Under this condition, high performers are subject to the countervailing forces
of high perceived ease of movement and low perceived desirability. One might project that the
net relation between performance and turnover would be near zero if the perceived ease and
perceived desirability of movement factors offset each other. Such vague predictions are
evidence that, as was the case in the utilization of contextual elements such as pay growth to
better understand the role of movement desirability, a somewhat more complex approach to the
performance-turnover relation was necessary for successful application of theoretical models of
turnover.
Accordingly, Jackofsky (1984) suggested that there will often be a curvilinear relation
between turnover and performance, such that turnover is most probable among both low
performers and high performers. She argued that low performers may be "pushed out" because
of "actual or perceived threat of administrative action" (p. 79). Steers and Mowday (1981) also
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saw low performers as likely turnover candidates through low satisfaction with the job's intrinsic
rewards. Thus, poor performers should have a high baseline turnover rate somewhat regardless
of moderators such as the reward system. Additionally, Jackofsky characterized "adequate"
performers as being allowed to remain with the firm and having relatively low turnover due to
low ease of movement. However, this ease of movement attribution would seem to contradict
the predicted high turnover of low performers, and in either case the ease of movement would
seemingly be subject to labor market condition at the time. Finally, she maintained that high
performers would enjoy numerous employment alternatives and, via the increased ease of
movement, would separate more frequently.
Although we find the curvilinear model to be appealing, further contextual considerations
appear to be necessary. For high performers, Jackofsky's model seems to assume that the
(positive) effects of performance on ease of movement are unlikely to be counteracted by the
(negative) effects of performance on perceived desirability of movement. In light of the March
and Simon (1958) model, this assumption seems reasonable to the extent that pay growth and
performance are not closely linked. Because high performers are of such critical importance to
the firm (e.g., Boudreau & Berger, 1985), a crucial issue to be investigated here is whether or
not the assumption holds when pay growth and performance are closely linked. Additionally,
Jackofsky's ease of movement component is in need of clarification, particularly with regard to
the effects of the labor market. In this study, we examine Jackofsky's proposed
performance-turnover curvilinearity both alone and from the perspective of labor market
condition and the reward system as its potential moderators.
The Reward System as a Moderator
Based on the preceding discussion of the movement desirability effects of a pay for
performance relation, we can extend Jackofsky's curvilinear model to predict performance level
specific turnover under such a reward system. At the high end of the performance continuum, a
synthesis of the Jackofsky (1984), March and Simon (1958), and pay for performance
implications seems to suggest that the diminished perceived desirability of movement stemming
from a strong pay-performance link will result in relatively lower high performer turnover
(compared to the weak pay-performance case) and a less pronounced curvilinearity. That is, in
the presence of performance based rewards, the turnover of high performers should resemble
the low movement tendencies of average performers as the increased ease of movement is
offset by decreased desirability of movement. Because this is in direct contrast to turnover
predictions in the absence of such rewards, where both ease and desirability of movement are
high, we argue that reward system features such as pay growth according to performance may
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have substantial impact on an organization's ability to retain its highest, most valuable
performers.
Thus, a central question is "What is the typical relation between pay and performance?"
A common response seems to be "small" (e.g., Lawler, 1981, 1989; Teel, 1986; Milkovich &
Newman, 1993; see Heneman, 1990 for a review). For example, Lawler (1989, p. 151)
comments that "All too often only a few percentage points separate the raises given good
performers from those given poor performers." Similarly, he mentions the problem of "topping
out," which refers to the fact that many organizations use merit increase guidelines that reduce
the size of the merit increase for employees higher in salary range or grade as a means of
controlling costs (Milkovich & Newman, 1993). Moreover, some merit increase guidelines also
reduce the frequency of within-grade pay increases for employees near the top of the range
(Milkovich & Newman, 1993), further reducing the pay-performance relation.
These types of factors may contribute to the perception of a weak relation between pay
and performance. A survey by the Hay Group (Garelik, 1984), for example, found that less than
one-half of middle managers and less than one-third of professionals thought that "better
performers" received "higher pay increases than average or poor performers" (p. 14). These
results were replicated in a more recent Hay Group (1994) survey. Where the perception is of a
weak pay-performance link, pay satisfaction among high performers may be low. Dyer and
Theriault (1976) did, in fact, report lower pay satisfaction among high performers, although they
did not report information on the nature of the reward system in their study.
Of course, merit pay increases (i.e., within-grade increases) are only one factor
contributing to overall salary growth over time. Promotions (i.e., between-grade increases) are
another major determinant (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1989). In fact, promotions often have a twofold
effect. First, there is typically a pay increase that goes with a promotion. Second, however, the
employee usually moves to a new pay grade where they will most likely be in a lower relative
position, thereby having the opportunity to earn larger and perhaps more frequent within-grade
increases. Thus, the impact of performance on promotions will have significant consequences
for the magnitude of the relation between performance and total pay growth (Gerhart &
Milkovich, 1992).
In some cases, promotions may be more closely related to performance than are within-
grade pay increases (e.g., in union or civil service jobs where within job pay differences can be
small or nonexistent). In other cases (e.g., private sector managerial and professional jobs),
however, promotion decisions may be less closely linked to current and past performance than
to other factors such as potential, breadth of experience, or area of expertise.' Although these
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can be justified as legitimate factors in promotion decisions, high performing employees who
have been passed over and find themselves at the top of the salary range with little opportunity
for salary growth may perceive pay inequity and entertain the possibility of leaving (i.e., an
increase in perceived desirability of movement). Indeed, in the only turnover studies to date that
utilized actual promotions (as opposed to promotion satisfaction or opportunities), Stumpf and
Dawley (1981) and Dreher (1982) predicted and found significant negative associations
between promotions and employee turnover.
In contrast to this view of a lack of promotions as contributing to turnover, there is also
reason to believe that receiving promotions might increase employee movement. Schwab
(1991) maintained that indicators of performance that are visible to the external market may play
a large role in the ability to acquire a different job. Specifically, signals that can be
communicated as evidence of individual employee worth may increase actual ease of
movement. It is reasonable to expect that promotions, which can be listed on one's resume
along with the accompanying new job titles, qualify as one of Schwab's externally visible
indicators and, hence, may influence turnover separately from the effects of pay growth.
Further conceptual support for a positive promotion-turnover relation exists in the
economic literature. Authors from this field have maintained that promotions reduce the
informational gap between the current and alternative employers (Rican i Costa, 1988),
enhance labor market visibility (Milgrom & Oster, 1987), and signal worker productivity to other
potential employers (Waldman, 1990).  Lazear (1986) argued that competing employers, when
better informed about worker quality in other firms, are more likely to hire those employees
away. Accordingly, Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) developed a model of strategic promotion
and wage decisions based in part upon the assumption that promotions induce turnover by
communicating employee value to competing firms.
We suggest that these visibility and signaling arguments can be reconciled with the
seemingly contradictory negative associations between promotion and turnover found in the
Stumpf and Dawley (1981) and Dreher (1982) studies. The two studies did not control for pay
growth, which can be closely tied to promotions (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1989). Because we
hypothesize that pay growth is also related to turnover, we suggest that it is likely that the
reported associations between promotions and turnover may in fact have been driven by pay
growth's relation with both variables. Therefore, it appears that the net impact of promotions
alone (i.e., controlling for pay growth), which would seem to pit decreased perceived desirability
of movement against increased actual ease of movement, has not been studied empirically in
organizational research. Although we recognize that pay growth and promotions can at times be
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highly correlated, we suggest that their conceptual distinction and predicted opposing influences
on turnover warrant examining independent effects.
In addition, similar to pay growth, promotions may moderate the effect of performance
on turnover. If including promotions in Schwab's (1991) framework is valid, it could be argued
that promotions would be of relatively greater importance to low performers as external
indicators of performance because these employees lack alternative indicators with which to
communicate their competence to outside firms. Compared to high performers, these
employees would have less access to recommendations, fewer successful experiences to
relate, and the liability of being unable to truthfully portray themselves in the market.
Thus, reward system factors such as pay for performance and promotions are important
for providing a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of job performance on
voluntary turnover. To date, however, only a limited number of individual studies have examined
reward system influence on the performance-turnover relation. This relative lackof attention is
surprising given the debate on performance and turnover, the research on the correspondence
between compensation and performance (e.g., Gerhart, Milkovich, & Murray, 1992; Milkovich &
Wigdor, 1991), and, to a lesser extent, extant work on compensation and turnover (e.g.,
Lakhani, 1988), which generally indicates that higher pay reduces turnover.
However, the small body of applicable research does suggest that the reward system
may be an important moderator. For example, Zenger (1992) found that turnover intentions
were greatest among moderately high and extremely low performers in two firms with strong ties
between pay and extreme performance. Park, Ofori-Dankworth, and Bishop (1994) reported that
only poor performer turnover was associated (positively) with the presence of individual
incentives. However, both of these studies were unable to directly measure individual turnover,
with Zenger utilizing turnover intention and Park et al. surveying small firm personnel directors
to determine the estimated portion of voluntary leavers who were of various performance levels.
In summary, reward system factors such as pay growth and promotions may moderate
the performance-turnover relation. Pay growth may not always be closely related to
performance. The result may be an increased risk of losing high performers. Consequently,
Jackofsky's curvilinear proposition (i.e., higher turnover for low and high performers) frequently
may be applicable, as may its implicit assumption that high performers' perceived ease of
movement will not be counteracted by negative effects of performance on perceived desirability
of movement. Curvilinearity may also result in part from the impact of promotions on low
performers, who may be increasingly likely to separate due to a signaling effect that facilitates
actual ease of movement. Examining different levels of pay growth and promotions may provide
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a more refined picture of this proposed curvilinear performance-turnov r relation, as well as help
explain conflicting results from performance-turnover research.
Labor Market Condition as a Moderator
In addition to the pay growth and promotion aspects of the reward system, another
contingency factor that may help explain the conditions under which turnover is more likely
among high performers is the condition of the labor market. Carsten and Spector (1987) report
that high unemployment rates reduce voluntary turnover. In addition, job dissatisfaction and
intentions to leave appear less likely to translate into turnover when unemployment rates are
high (Gerhart, 1990b). Neither of these studies, however, examined whether turnover of low and
high performers was equally influenced by labor market conditions. One hypothesis is that low
performers may not have many attractive alternative job opportunities unless there is a shortage
of workers in the labor market. In contrast, it may be that companies are always in the market
for "star" performers, regardless of overall employment demand in the market or in their
organization (Keller, 1984; McEvoy & Cascio, 1987). If so, the linkage between labor market
conditions and turnover might be strongest among low performers. In contrast, turnover among
high performers would be less responsive to labor market conditions.
Curvilinearity
Two studies have found support for a curvilinear relation consistent with Jackofsky's
(1984) model, such that low performers and high performers were more likely to leave than
average performers (Jackofsky, Ferris, & Breckenridge, 1986; Mossholder, Bedeian, Norris,
Giles, & Feild, 1988). Neither of these studies, however, reported on the extent to which the two
possible contingency factors, (a) the reward system and (b) the labor market, contributed to
their findings. Apparently complicating the issue of curvilinearity are recent studies that explicitly
tested for but failed to find this relation. Yet, closer examination reveals that each could be
interpreted as supporting this study's reconceptualization of Jackofsky's (1984) curvilinearity
model in a more flexible framework, where extreme moderator levels can determine the degree
and even the existence of nonlinearity.
Birnbaum and Summers (1993) reported no evidence of either a curvilinear or linear
relationship between performance and voluntary turnover in a sample of 142 nurses. However,
this profession's extremely high market demand and low supply in the study's setting, which
were cited by the authors, may be at the heart of performance's apparent lack of impact on
turnover. Such an unusual supply and demand imbalance could well result in high ease of
movement and high turnover throughout the job performance range, particularly considering that
bidding wars might inflate movement desirability for all performance levels as well. The fact that
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35 percent of the nursing sample voluntarily separated in an interval of only 21 months supports
this contention.
A second study (Wright & Bonett, 1993) that failed to find a curvilinear relation concluded
that the job performance of 93 human services supervisors was positively linearly associated
with voluntary turnover. This result also is not surprising given the authors' notation of the virtual
absence of any actual or illusory correspondence between pay and performance. Hence, one
might expect large numbers of poor performers to take advantage (low movement desirability)
by staying and high performers to seek more equitable treatment (high movement desirability)
elsewhere, essentially flattening the hypothesized curve and resulting in the positive linear
association. Additionally, considering that this study totaled only 27 actual "leavers,” it may well
be that there simply was not enough statistical power with which to detect any deviations from
turnover linearity at the ends of the performance range. Hence, neither of the two studies
provides convincing evidence contradicting Jackofsky's (1984) curvilinearity hypothesis.
Moreover, careful examination of the labor market condition and reward system moderators in
terms of movement ease and desirability recasts the respective results as unsurprising, if not
expected.
Meta-analytic Evidence
Although there is little research that has directly examined how the reward system and
the labor market affect the relation between performance and turnover, recent meta-analytic
research has begun to focus the discussion in this direction. McEvoy and Cascio (1987), Bycio,
Hackett, and Alvares (1990), and Williams and Livingstone (1994) report weighted uncorrected
correlations of -.22, -.17, and -.16, respectively, in meta-analyses of voluntary performance and
turnover. Given the mounting evidence for the negative linear relation, efforts must now
advance from a debate over conflicting findings of positive and negative linear associations to
the potentially more informative issues of nonlinearity and potential moderators. McEvoy and
Cascio (1987) recognized the importance of examining the curvilinearity hypothesis and the
effect of labor market conditions, but data limitations hindered their efforts, leading them to call
for future research on those issues.
The Williams and Livingstone (1994) meta-analysis attempted to test as moderators the
pay-performance link and the labor market condition. However, Williams and Livingstone
acknowledged that data limitations precluded strong conclusions and they called for individual
studies of the type reported here. Regarding the reward system, because the studies
incorporated into the meta-analysis did not tend to be concerned with rewards, coding for the
moderator was done by virtue of any mention in the study of reward contingency. Even though
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the authors reported high inter-rater reliability, this does not dismiss the validity concerns,
particularly given the looseness with which the concept of pay for performance tends to be
referred to in studies. However, given that many of the studies were of sales representatives
(where reward contingencies are more likely), the finding of a stronger negative
performance-turnover relation when reward contingencies were present suggests that further
inquiry into rewards as moderators is worthwhile.
Williams and Livingstone (1994) again faced data constraints in their analysis of the
moderating effect of labor market condition, which they operationalized as unemployment rate.
The authors looked for moderator effects for each of the national, industrial, occupational, state
and city unemployment rates across studies, only finding an effect at the state level. However, it
is likely that the most appropriate type of unemployment rate for each study will differ on the
basis of industry, occupation, and so forth (Malm, 1954). Moreover, it was not possible for them
to control error sources such as labor market structural shifts from different years. Norming each
study's appropriate unemployment rate against that rate's distribution for the year in question
would be one possibility. Alternatively, tracking one organization with a large sample size, as
was done in the present study, provides an opportunity for increased precision in studying labor
market effects.
While the moderator analyses performed by Williams and Livingstone (1994) suffered to
some extent from the lack of individual studies examining reward contingency and labor market
condition as moderators, investigation of the curvilinear hypothesis simply may not belong at the
meta-analytic level. As Schwab (1991) suggests, meta-analysis may lead to faulty conclusions
when looking at complex moderator relationships, such as those likely to comprise the
performance-turnover relation. Though they do interpret their meta-analysis of quadratic senu-
partial correlations as supporting the curvilinear hypothesis, Williams and Livingstone
acknowledge that interpretation and explanation of this relationship is best made on a study-by-
study basis. Similarly, McEvoy and Cascio (1987) attempted an indirect test of curvilinearity in
their meta- nalysis and cited the need for more research on this issue.
Hypotheses
We have argued on conceptual grounds that curvilinearity, the reward system (including
both pay growth relative to performance and promotions), and labor market condition are
essential to attaining a more comprehensive understanding of the performance-tu nover
relation. Moreover, the two definitive meta-analyses of performance and turnover (McEvoy &
Cascio, 1987; Williams & Livingstone, 1994) have recognized the importance of and attempted
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to examine these issues. In each case, their attempts have been severely undermined by the
relative dearth of applicable empirical research.
Their insightful works do provide some tentative conclusions regarding curvilinearity, the
reward system, and labor market condition, but they also make a valuable contribution in
suggesting how researchers might better design future studies of these issues. For example, we
extend the ambitious attempt by Williams and Livingstone (1994) by examining not only
moderators and curvilinearity, but also moderators of curvilinearity. In addition to the meta-
analyses indicating the research gaps in the study of performance and turnover, Schwab (1991)
discussed contextual factors such as organizational rewards and the external market as
potential moderators and noted that these complex relationships are best examined by
individual investigations. We respond here to these calls for such studies.
The present study asks the following questions. First, which performance groups are
most likely to leave an organization? Based on the literature reviewed above, we hypothesize
that
H1: There is a curvilinear relation between performance and turnover. Specifically,
turnover will be highest among low and high performers, lower among average
performers.
Second, what contextual factors might help explain whether it is low, average, or high
performers that are most likely to leave? To begin to answer this question in terms of possible
reward system moderators, we make use of a model (Gerhart, 1990a) that specifies total salary
growth to be largely a function of factors measured after the time of hire, such as average
performance rating (thereby potentially incorporating a pay-performance link) and length of
service with the organization. Given that we assume a negative main effect of salary growth on
turnover, the implication is that while low pay growth (i.e., relatively low average annual pay
increase) should increase turnover through increasing desirability of movement, this effect will
be stronger as performance and the subsequent ease of movement increases. Thus, the
curvilinear nature of the performance-turnover relation (higher turnover for low and high, versus
average, performers) should be more pronounced on the high performance end for employees
with low pay growth than for those with high pay growth. With high pay growth, as performance
and perceived ease of movement increase, perceived desirability of movement is somewhat
diminished, and the tendency to turnover should not increase to the same degree.
H2: The negative effect of salary growth on turnover will be greatest at high performance
levels. More specifically, at high performance levels turnover will be more strongly
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positively related to performance among employees with low salary growth than among
employees with high salary growth.
The second reward system element of interest in this study is promotions. Because the
role of promotions has been relatively neglected in turnover research, we also include a main
effect hypothesis for this proposed moderator. High promotions may increase the desirability of
staying with the firm, due to the immediate salary growth, its potential growth in the future, and
perhaps such factors as increased recognition, challenge, and job satisfaction. On the other
hand, promotions also provide the employee with relatively objective evidence of ability that can
be used in the external job market. We argue that the majority of promotions' potential negative
effect on turnover is tied to salary growth and, once this is controlled for, the positive effect of
promotions on ease of movement will outweigh its negative effects on movement desirability.
H3: After controlling for salary growth, promotions will be positively related to turnover.
In addition to this main effect, there is reason to be believe that promotions moderate the
performance-turnover relation. As noted earlier, while promotions should enhance the ease of
movement for all employees, this should be especially true at the lower levels of performance,
where employees have fewer indicators of worth which can be demonstrated to the external job
market. Thus, the curvilinear nature of the performance-tur over relation should be more
pronounced on the low performance end for employees with high promotions than for those with
low promotions.
H4: The positive effect of promotions on turnover (controlling for salary growth) will be
greatest at low performance levels. More specifically, at low performance levels turnover
will be more strongly negatively related to performance among employees with high
promotions than among employees with low promotions.
In addition to reward system factors influencing turnover, there is clearly a need to
include the status of available outside opportunities. These opportunities are a major component
in perceived and actual ease of movement and are conceptualized here as labor demand.
When labor demand is low it is logical that high performers will experience greater success on
the job market. Poor performers, in contrast, may need the assistance of a less restrictive job
market to find alternative employment.
H5: Turnover will be more strongly positively related to labor demand among low
performers than among high performers.
Because all of our hypotheses are predicated on the belief that turnover can be
dysfunctional for the organization, particularly when high performers separate, it is useful to
more closely examine the validity of that belief and the relative efficacy of strategies designed to
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mitigate turnover. Hence, as an extension of our prediction that salary growth not only
influences turnover, but does so differentially according to performance, we are interested in the
costs and benefits associated with various performance based pay policies. However, projecting
the value of such strategies is not straightforward. Linking pay growth and performance should
precipitate increased separations among low performers, producing higher turnover rates and
commensurately higher movement costs (incurred to administer the separation and acquisition
process). Also, increasing pay for high performers will increase compensation and related costs
(e.g., benefits) to some degree. These two costs are likely to be relatively visible to most
organizations, perhaps suggesting that linking pay growth to performance is too costly.
However, these cost factors should be assessed in light of the potentially increased value of the
work force, created by the retention of more high performers and fewer low performers.
Researchers or managers considering the implications of the present findings require a method
of aggregation that allows these various effects to be placed on a common scale.
Traditionally, utility analysis has been used to aggregate diverse effects into a common
dollar-valued scale (Boudreau, 1991). Utility analysis applications exist for selection, training
and performance feedback, but not for compensation (Boudreau, 1991; Gerhart & Milkovich,
1992; Gerhart, Trevor, & Graham, in press). Yet, compensation strategy decisions present
similar challenges due to the diverse measurement scales for the various outcomes. Because
prior utility analysis research has produced models for estimating the value of separation and
acquisition patterns (Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Boudreau, 1991), we can use the Boudreau and
Berger separation/acquisition utility model to illustrate the dollar value implications of alternative
compensation policies as they affect separations and acquisitions over time and differentially by
performance level. Although we do not suggest that the resulting model is a definitive treatment
of the utility of compensation strategies, the application provides a starting point that we hope
will encourage others to build further.
In sum, research suggests that the performance-turnover relation is negative when
constrained to a linear association but may in fact be curvilinear. Additionally, authors of recent
turnover studies have begun to recognize that contextual factors may moderate the effect of
performance on turnover. Consequently, in this investigation we attempted to test whether the
performance-turnover relation is curvilinear and whether salary growth, promotions, and labor
demand are important contextual elements for understanding the performance-turnover
dynamic. Moreover, we emphasize that our hypothesized interactions involving salary growth
and promotions pose these contingencies as moderators of a curvilinear relationship. Finally,
through examining various pay strategies' effects on turnover and the projected work forces'
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The sample was composed of all (N = 5,143) exempt employees hired between 1983
and 1988 who were either (a) still employed in the organization as of January 1, 1990 (N =
3,635), (b) had voluntarily resigned prior to that date (N = 1,188), or (c) had separated
involuntarily (N = 320). Because our sample included all exempt hires in a large organization, a
broad spectrum of job types is represented. Included employees were distributed across a
number of different divisions and locations, but in each case, the product or service was tied to
the petroleum industry.
Measures
Voluntary turnover. This variable was coded "1" if the employee had resigned
voluntarily as of January 1, 1990. It was coded as "0" if the employee was still employed with
the organization as of that date. Involuntary terminations were also coded as "0", allowing the
proportional hazards model to utilize the fact that these employees did not voluntarily separate
during their tenure. Failure to include involuntary terminations may result in bias and significant
loss of information (Morita, Lee, & Mowday, 1993).
Average performance rating. This variable represents the average of all supervisor
performance ratings received subsequent to the hire date. Supervisors utilized global rating
scales in assessing employee performance. In several of the models, average performance
level categories were created to capture any nonlinear relations or to examine possible
interactions with other variables. The performance scale ranged from "1" (lowest) to "5"
(highest), with "3" as the omitted level.
Salary growth. Average annual salary growth was defined as the change from the
starting salary to the last observed salary, divided by the time interval between the two salaries.
As such, it reflects salary growth stemming from both within- and between-grade (promotion)
increases. In computing salary growth, we first transformed salary levels by using the consumer
price index to adjust for inflation and by taking the natural logarithm. The mean amount of time
between first and last salary observations was 3.09 years. The mean annual average salary
increase was 9.8% (6.1% adjusted for cost of living changes). In 1989 dollars, the mean starting
salary was $31,824 and the last observed salary was $38,185. Salary growth is related to pay
for performance to the extent that it correlates with performance.
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Promotions. The promotions variable was constructed by dividing an employees total
number of promotions by years of tenure. This operationalization presumes that, in terms of
signaling the external market, the raw number of promotions would not be as informative as a
time indexed measure. For example, two promotions in six years would be less appealing to a
prospective new employer than would two promotions in three years.
Labor demand. This was measured using information available in the annual Recruiting
Trends report issued by Michigan State University Placement Services (e.g., Shingleton &
Scheetz, 1983). Somewhere between 600 and 1,000 organizations respond to the survey each
year regarding their college recruiting practices and plans. The key question used here for
assessing labor demand is "This year, what change, if any, does your organization anticipate in
the hiring of new college graduates?" The responses are summarized to yield an expected
percentage change in hiring plans. Moreover, responses are reported separately for different
categories of employers. The data used in the present study pertain to hiring plans among
employers reporting themselves to be in the petroleum industry. Industry specific labor demand
was used because exempt employees likely acquire industry specific competencies which
would make the petroleum industry a relevant external market. Additionally, perceived ease of
movement may be formulated by individuals on the basis of the most readily salient labor
market indicator, which could be whether their own company is hiring. The construct validity of
the hiring plans measure is supported by the fact that it correlated .73 (p < .05, one-tailed test)
over a 5-year period with actual hiring in the organization studied.
Control variables. Several factors which could reasonably be expected to be related to
turnover and the predictors of interest were controlled for in the study. Except when models
were stratified by hire year (see Analyses below), dummy variables were included for year of
hire to adjust for the nature of the labor market and unmeasured industry factors present in the
year each cohort was hired. In these equations 1983 was the comparison year. Salary level was
included in the models and defined as the final pay level on each employee's record; thus, this
variable denotes salary at time of turnover for those who left the firm, and 1989 salary for those
who stayed. Additionally, we controlled for marital status and age.
Analyses
Data on tenure with the organization were treated as survival time (also known as failure
time) data (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980). To estimate the influence of the independent variables
on the survival probabilities, a proportional hazards rate model was used (Cox, 1972). For
statistical software we utilized SAS's (SAS Institute, 1991) PHIZEG procedure. Applications of
the proportional hazards model to the study of employee turnover (Judge & Watanabe, 1995;
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Morita, Lee, & Mowday, 1989; Morita, Lee, & Mowday, 1993; Sheridan, 1992) and employee
absenteeism (Fichman, 1989; Harrison & Hulin, 1989) are available. This model is partially
parametric in the following sense. It does not impose any distributional assumptions on the data.
However, it does assume that hazard functions (i.e., the probability of turnover, conditional on
tenure) at different levels of an independent variable are proportional to some unknown baseline
hazard function.
One advantage of proportional hazards modeling is its use of information on survival
time (i.e., tenure), rather than relying solely on a simple dichotomous turnover dependent
variable. This provides a vehicle for partially accounting for censored data, such as that
resulting from the tenure of employees who are involuntarily terminated. That is, because the
dependent variable is voluntary turnover conditional on tenure, the model incorporates
information on the tenure of involuntary terminations coupled with the fact that there was no
voluntary turnover during that tenure. Additionally, employees who resign one day into the study
are differentiated from those that terminate two years into the study's investigation window.
Such information can be lost when treating turnover simply as a dichotomous outcome, which
may result in conflicting findings from the two approaches, the potential for which was
empirically demonstrated by Morita, Lee, and Mowday (1993).
We stratified our proportional hazards analyses by hire year, which allows each hire year
cohort to be in proportion to potentially different baseline hazard functions. This decision was
made after examining the graphs of natural logarithms of the cumulative baseline hazard
functions for each hire year cohort as a check of the proportionality assumption (Andersen,
1982). Although the functions appeared to be proportional to each other, with each new hire
year one year of potential tenure is lost because 1989 is the final year of data for all hire year
cohorts. Thus, we could not be sure that each year's baseline function would remain
proportional over the entire tenure domain and we took the more conservative stratification
approach. Hence, our proportional hazards regression model, prior to adding interactions, was:
hi(t;x) = hi(t) exp[Bj(Xcontrols)+B2(Xperformance)+B3(Xsalarygrowth)+B4(xpromos)],
 where
hi(t;x) = the hazard function (i.e., conditional probability of turnover) at time t, for e ployees
hired in year i with predictors x,
hi(t) = the baseline hazard function for individuals hired in year i,
B's = the estimated regression weights,
X's = the explanatory variables.
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While this main effects model is conceptually correct, we note that in most models performance
is treated as a nine level categorical variable and B2 is actually a vector of eight regression
weights.
Testing for and illustrating interactions was somewhat complicated by our conception of
a curvilinear performance-turnover relation. In the cases of salary growth and promotions as
potential moderators, we took the standard approach of including the cross product terms (i.e.,
the categorical performance by interval salary growth and promotions measures each yielded
nine cross product terms, one of which was omitted) in the model to statistically test for
interaction significance. We then graphed survival probabilities by average performance ratings
for various levels of the moderator, which allowed interpretation of potential changes in the
curvilinearity.
In testing for an interaction between labor demand and performance, we were unable to
simply include an individual labor demand score for each observation. Such attempts as utilizing
labor demand from an individual's last year with the firm or creating an average labor demand
proved to be problematic. For example, last year labor demand would assign the identical value
(1989 labor demand) to all of the stayers and would neglect the labor demand levels in years
that the leavers did not separate. Average labor demand as a potential measure suffered from
several shortcomings, including the distribution of the labor demand values over the time of the
study. Because the two highest years of labor demand were the final two years of the study, all
stayers would have high years included in the average computation, though those hired late in
the study would never face low demand years. Similarly, late hired leavers would never have
faced low demand.
As a result of these types of problems, the following approach was used to test for an
interaction between labor demand and average performance rating. First, hazard rates were
estimated for each year of hire cohort and tenure level combination. Second, the potential
turnover year corresponding to each year of hire and tenure level combination was identified by
adding the years of tenure to the hire year. Third, the labor demand data (described above) for
each potential year of turnover were arrayed in a matrix along with the corresponding hazard
rate for that year. This approach was taken separately for each performance category. Thus, the
matrix for each performance category would appear as follows:
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           Hire Year Tenure Potential Hazard     Labor Demand
Year of Rate
Turnover
1983 1 1984 h1 LD1
1983 2 1985 h2 LD2
1983 3 1986 h3 LD3
1983 4 1987 h4 LD4
1983 5 1988 h5 LD5
1983 6 1989 h6 LD6
1984 1 1985 h7 LD2
1984 2 1986 h8 LD3
1984 3 1987 h9 LD4
1984 4 1988 h10 LD5
1984 5 1989 h11 LD6
1985 1 1986 h12 LD3
1985 2 1987 h13 LD4
1985 3 1988 h14 LD5
1985 4 1989 h15 LD6
1986 1 1987 h16 LD4
1986 2 1988 h17 LD5
1986 3 1989 h18 LD6
1987 1 1988 h19 LD5
1987 2 1989 h20 LD6
1988 1 1989 h21 LD6
Because hazard rate is a function of tenure level, formal testing for labor demand effects
on the performance-turnover relation was confined to one tenure level at a time. Tenure level
equal to one year provided the largest sample size (n=6) and the greatest variance in labor
demand for conducting examination of a possible labor demand moderator (in this context,
tenure equal to one year actually represents anywhere from one to two years of company
experience). This examination was accomplished through correlating labor demand and hazard
rate for each performance category.
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Utility Analysis
In order to estimate the dollar value implications of different approaches to pay growth,
we adapted the Boudreau and Berger (1985) separation/acquisition utility model, which
estimates three components in each relevant time period: (1) the movement costs associated
with separations and acquisitions; (2) the service costs (pay, benefits, and associated
expenses) required to support the work force; and (3) the servic  value, or dollar value of the
goods and services produced by the work force. The dollar-valued implications of different
separation and acquisition patterns over time was estimated by summing the stream of service
value levels, and then subtracting the stream of service costs and movement costs.  Boudreau
and Berger applied this model to examine effects of changes in selection validity and the
correlation between separations and performance levels. Although the three fundamental
components apply just as well to the present study, this case differs in that we consider
alternative pay strategies (which may or may not affect the validity of employee selection) and
we do not assume a linear relation (correlation) between separations and performance, perhaps
providing a more precise characterization of the relation.
Using our data on the four-year survival probabilities of employees hired between the
years 1983 and 1988, we applied the Boudreau and Berger (1985) model to a four-year period.
We modeled the investment decision as follows. In 1989, this organization might have chosen
pay growth strategies that would or would not link pay to performance. Each potential strategy
would lead to a change in separation and retention patterns over the four years (1990 through
1993). In 1993, after the four-year effects, the organization would possess a work force
reflecting the performance distribution produced by the previous pay strategies. Thus, by
calculating the change in movement costs, service costs and service value between 1989 and
1993, and assuming that the intervening changes were linear, we estimated the cumulative
effects of a pay strategy over the four-yea  period. Hence, we used predicted survival
probabilities to estimate the changes in the performance distribution over four years under
different pay strategies and we then attached a dollar value to those changes by subtracting the
associated movement costs and service costs from service value.
We chose three pay strategies to span a continuum from very conservative to very
aggressive in linking pay to performance. There is little empirical data on the distribution of
specific pay-growth policies across pay levels, so we constructed three hypothetical, but
realistic, strategies. That is, each pay strategy was constructed from the sample's actual mean
and standard deviation of pay growth over the study period. Then, pay strategies were
constructed as deviations from the mean. Specifically, Pay Strategy 1 was to give employees in
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all performance categories average pay increases (for their particular performance category)
over the four-year period. Pay Strategy 2 gave average pay increases to most employees, but
those in the three highest performance categories (performance ratings 4, 4.5, and 5) were
given yearly increases equal to one standard deviation above the mean for their respective
performance category.  Pay Strategy 3 was similar to Pay Strategy 2, except that we added a
low-pay component, in which those in the lowest two performance categories (performance
ratings 1 and 1.5) were given yearly pay increases equal to one standard deviation below the
mean for their particular performance category.3 We then assessed the dollar-value implications
related to each strategy's implementation.
Results
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the study's variables are presented in
Table 1. As expected, the zero-order linear relationship between performance and turnover was
negative, replicating the results of the three recent meta-analyses (Bycio, Hackett, & Alvares,
1990; McEvoy & Cascio, 1987; Williams & Livingstone, 1994). Also of interest in these
correlational results, promotions were negatively related to turnover, seemingly in opposition to
H4. However, as will be discussed, partialling out the effects of salary growth reveals an entirely
different conclusion regarding promotions and turnover.
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Table 1
Means. Standard Deviations, and Correlationsa
                                                                                                                                                                                      __
Variables Means                     s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7           8          9
                                                                                                                                                                                      __
1. Turnover 0.23 0.42
2. Tenure 3.40 1.64 -.31
3. Performance 2.74 0.66 -.20 .19
4. Salary growth 0.06 0.05 -.21 .05 .15
5. Promotions 0.41 0.45 -.11 .00 .05 .80
6. Salary 10.47 0.39 -.22 .19 .28 .06 -.02
7. Age 33.16 7.42 -.07 .18 .06 -.33 -.33 .15
8. Marital status 0.54 0.50 -.06 .14 .11 -.19 -.18 .17           31
9. Hire year 1985.71 1.65 -.20 -.66 .03 .12 .10 .05         -.21       -.11
                                                                                                                                                                                      __
Note. Correlations above +.05 are significant at p < .001, two-tailed test.
an = 5,143
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Proportional Hazards Analyses
To begin to test the first hypothesis, that the relation between voluntary turnover and
performance is curvilinear, we applied the multiple regression procedure advocated by Cohen
and Cohen (1983) to the proportional hazards regression case. This was done by testing a
model with the continuous performance variable (rather than the categorical performance
variable), and then adding its squared term. As evidence of curvilinearity, the squared term
coefficient and the increase in model fit were significant (see Table 2).
We then examined the validity of this study's approach to assessing curvilinearity in the
performance-turnover relation with a nine level categorical performance measure. Substituting
this measure for the continuous performance measure and its square provided eight
performance coefficients, five of which were significant. We found this model to be a
significantly better fit to the data than the nested model without performance. By computing D
statistics, which are similar to the R2 values in more common regression models (Hintze, 1989),
we were able to directly compare the categorical performance model with the quadratic
continuous performance model. The D statistics in Table 2 reveal that the categorical
performance model accounts for more conditional turnover variance than does the quadratic
model (by a factor of 1.077, or 7.7 percent). Thus, performance-turnover curvilinearity and the
use of a categorical performance measure in its assessment were supported.
Table 2: Comparison of Proportional Hazard Regression Analyses of Voluntary Turnover
for Continuous and Categorical Performance Measures
Continuous Performance Categorical
Independent Variables Baseline Linear Quadratic Performance
Promotions      .763***      .737***      .743***      .703***
Salary Growth -22.343*** -19.985*** -19.321*** -18.912***
Average Performance     -.406***   -2.20***
Squared Average Performance      .341***
Average Performance = 1.0    1.676***
Average Performance = 1.5    0.241
Average Performance = 2.0    0.640***
Average Performance = 2.5   -0.223*
Average Performance = 3.0      ---
Average Performance = 3.5   -0.399**
Average Performance = 4.0    0.094
Average Performance = 4.5    0.011
Average Performance = 5.0    1.644***
Change in Model Chi-square 56.878*** 52.827***        195.340***
D      .1383     .1464     .1539                .1658
Note. Equations also include salary level, marital status, and age.  Performance ranges from 1
(lowest) to 5 (highest).
*p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001
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As Sheridan (1992) noted, the magnitude of the D statistic from proportional hazards
models will generally be smaller than variance explained statistics from regressions that only
predict turnover probability. This is a result of the dependent variable in proportional hazards
being turnover conditional on tenure. That is, we are attempting to explain turnover probability at
specific times, not simply whether or not turnover occurred (Peters & Sheridan, 1988). As a
point of reference, however, Sheridan's (1992) turnover study with proportional hazards
modeling accounted for less variance (D = .09) than the present study (D = .17).
In order to illustrate and interpret the performance-tur over curvilinearity, we plotted
survival probabilities based on the proportional hazards model. As Figure 1 indicates, the
performance-turnover relation does indeed appear to be curvilinear (note that the vertical axis
represents survival probability, and is thus the inverse of turnover probability). For comparison
purposes, the relation was plotted for three separate tenure levels. The probability of remaining
employed throughout each of the tenure levels initially increases with performance, but then
levels off. In all three scenarios, survival probabilities sharply decrease in the highest
performance rating category. Furthermore, comparisons with plots of the predicted values from
the equations imposing linearity revealed that the most dramatic differences between linear and
nonlinear representations were at the highest performance rating category. In sum, these
findings strongly suggest that the relation between turnover and performance in this sample is
not linear, but rather is approximated better by the curvilinear function described in Hl. This
curvilinearity appears to be robust with regard to tenure.
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Figure 1. Survival probability by average performance rating and tenure.
One possible explanation for this finding would be a weak relation between performance
and salary growth. Table 3 reports two sets of estimates from regressing salary growth on
performance. The first equation treats the relation between salary growth and performance as
linear and depicts a significant positive association between the two. However, the second
equation uses performance categories to allow for a possible nonlinear relation. Of particular
interest from this equation is the fact that, when compared to the omitted performance rating
category 3, top performance (average rating = 5) is not related to salary growth. While all other
performance levels, excepting 2.5, are significantly tied to salary growth, the most valuable
employees do not appear to be paid according to their performance.
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Table 3: Regression Analyses of Average Annual Salary Growth on Continuous and
Categorical Average Performance Ratings
Equation 1 Equation 2
Independent Variables Coefficient      S.E. Coefficient        SE.
Average Performance .0088*** .0007
Average Performance = 1.0 -.0238*** .0040
Average Performance = 1.5 -.0171*** .0032
Average Performance = 2.0 -.0080*** .0012
Average Performance = 2.5 .0008 .0012
Average Performance = 3.0            ----             ---
Average Performance = 3.5 .0056*** .0014
Average Performance = 4.0 .0108*** .0019
Average Performance = 4.5 .0147** .0046
Average Performance = 5.0 .0098 .0064
Promotions .0891*** .0010 .0887*** .0010
Salary Level .0082*** .0012 .0078*** .0012
Marital Status -.0050*** .0009 -.0050*** .0009
Age -.0006*** .0001 -.0006*** .0001
Intercept -.0648*** .0117 -.03 61** .0122
R2          .66       .67
                                                                                                                                        
Note.  Equations also include dummy variables for year of hire. Performance ranges from 1
(lowest) to 5 (highest).
*p < .05   **p < .01   ***p < .001
The predicted values obtained from each equation appear in Figure 2 and appear to confirm the
inequitable salary growth of top performers. Salary growth does increase as a function of
performance up through performance rating 4.5. However, analysis of the predicted values
reveals that salary growth increases approximately 2.4 times quicker (i.e., the slope is 2.4 times
greater) between performance levels 1 and 2.5 than between performance levels 2.5 and 4.5,
suggesting a declining pay-performance relation as pay increases. Moreover, predicted salary
growth actually decreases as average performance increases from 4.5 to 5. To the extent that
high performing employees are aware of this fact, they may not feel equitably treated and
movement may become increasingly desirable. This could well be the case as these diminishing
returns to high performance correspond almost perfectly with the diminishing top performer
survival probabilities depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 2. Salary growth as a function of continuous and categorical performance measures.
As a more formal test of the possible interaction between salary growth and
performance, two equations were estimated. The first contained only main effects for
performance, salary growth, promotions and the controls. The second equation added eight
terms for the cross-products of salary growth and the performance categories. Comparison of
the two equations revealed a statistically significant improvement in the model and,
consequently, a significant interaction between salary growth and performance (see Table 4).
Although the individual term representing the top performance (5.0) by salary growth
cross-product is not strictly significant, it does approach significance (p = . 115) even though it is
limited by low statistical power (n=23). (In an unreported analysis, we recreated the top
performance by salary growth term by combining performance categories 4.5 and 5.0 in order to
gain power, which resulted in a cross-product term significant at the .01 level.)
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Table 4: Results of Proportional Hazard Regression Analyses of Voluntary Turnover
                                                                                                                                    
Main Effects      Salary Growth           Promotions
Independent Variables     Model                 Interaction Model       Interaction Model
                                                                                                                                              
Salary Level -0.717*** -0.700*** -0.715***
Age -0.050*** -0.052*** -0.051***
Marital Status (1 = married)-0.191** -0.190** -0.199**
Average Performance = 1.0 1.676*** 1.359*** 1.412***
Average Performance = 1.5 0.241 -0.157 -0.046
Average Performance = 2.0 0.640*** 0. 218t 0.422***
Average Performance = 2.5-0.223* -0.518*** -0.345**
Average Performance = 3.5-0.399** -0.5191 -0.426*
Average Performance = 4.0 0.094 0.5151 0.424t
Average Performance = 4.5 0.011 1.436* 0.074
Average Performance = 5.0 1.644*** 2.549*** 1.885***
Salary Growth -18.912*** -24.827*** -19.788***
Promotions 0.703*** 0.634*** 0.422*
Salary Growth X (Performance = 1.0) 15.481
Salary Growth X (Performance = 1.5) 13.364**
Salary Growth X (Performance = 2.0) 10.156***
Salary Growth X (Performance = 2.5) 6.220*
Salary Growth X (Performance = 3.5) 3.158
Salary Growth X (Performance = 4.0) -6.751
Salary Growth X (Performance = 4.5) -25.562t
Salary Growth X (Performance = 5.0) -15.531
Promotions X (Performance = 1.0) 1.103*
Promotions X (Performance = 1.5) 1.201t
Promotions X (Performance = 2.0) 0.633***
Promotions X (Performance = 2.5) 0.331
Promotions X (Performance = 3.5) 0.115
Promotions X (Performance = 4.0) -1.057 t
Promotions X (Performance = 4.5) -0.233
Promotions X (Performance = 5.0) -0.491
Change in Model Chi-square (df = 8) 47.47*** 21.23**
                                                                                                                                           
t p<.10   *p<.05   **p<.0l    ***p<.001
To more closely examine the nature of the interaction of salary growth and performance,
the relation between turnover and salary growth was estimated separately through proportional
hazards regressions for each performance category. As the coefficients in Table 5 indicate, the
relation between salary growth and turnover is negative at all performance levels, but is much
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stronger at higher performance categories, providing support for H2. In other words, turnover
decisions of high performers depend more strongly on their salary growth experience than do
turnover decisions of low performers.
Table 5: Proportional Hazard Regressions of Voluntary Turnover on Average Annual
Salary Growth and Average Annual Promotions, for each Average Performance Category
Salary Growth Promotions Number of
Average Performance Level Coefficient Coefficient Observations
Average Performance = 1.0 -19.54*** 1.65* 60
Average Performance = 1.5 -24.83** .93 97
Average Performance = 2.0 -13.44*** .49* 1171
Average Performance = 2.5 -21.41** .73* 1090
Average Performance = 3.0 -22.58*** .69*** 1667
Average Performance = 3.5 -21.40*** .58 672
Average Performance = 4.0 -30.60*** .46 317
Average Performance = 4.5 -82.56* 3.01 46
Average Performance = 5.0 -54.54t -.28 23
                                                                                                                                    
Note.  At each performance category, equation also includes salary level, age, marital status
and year of hire. Performance ranges from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).
t p<.10   *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001
To illustrate this moderating effect of salary growth on the performance-turnover relation,
we computed survival probabilities for three levels of salary growth (i.e., at salary growth's
mean, and at plus and minus one standard deviation) throughout the performance range (see
Figure 3). The more pronounced curvilinearity in the low salary growth condition, which was
predicted in H2, implies that failure to pay top performers for that performance results in greater
loss of these valuable employees. In contrast, high pay for performance serves to keep these
high performers with the firm. These findings strongly suggest that organizations need to be
especially concerned with equitable salary growth among its top performers. Given the survival
curve for mean salary growth, and the previous conclusion that the top average performance
rating is not related to salary growth, it appears that the firm in this study may be paying a stiff
price for failing to equitably reward star performers.
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Figure 3. Survival probability by average performance rating and salary growth.
The lack of research on the effect of promotions prompted our third hypothesis, which
proposed that average annual promotions would increase turnover. While the correlation
between promotions and turnover was significantly negative, in the proportional hazards
regression model, once the effects of salary growth and the other variables were partialled out,
promotions did in fact have a positive impact on turnover (see Table 2). Thus, H3 and our
supposition of promotions contributing to employee viability on the external market were
supported.  Interpretation of this .703 promotions coefficient is possible at each level of
promotions in a manner analogous to interpretation in ordinary least squares regression (Morita,
Lee, & Mowday, 1993). Assume two employees were equal in all respects except that employee
one had averaged one promotion per year while employee two had no promotions. Because
their respective hazard functions would differ only by the exponentiated promotions variable
value, employee one would be more likely to leave by a factor of exp[(.703) x (1 - 0)). Hence,
controlling for the other variables, increasing average promotions from zero to one increases
turnover likelihood by a factor of 2.02. Employee one would be twice as likely to leave as
employee two, all else remaining equal.
Although this interpretation would seem to imply that, assuming salary growth is
retained, limiting promotions might be a viable strategy for reducing turnover, analysis of the
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promotions performance interaction provides a more appropriate explanation. Addition of the
eight performance by promotions cross product terms resulted in a significantly better fit for the
proportional hazards model (see Table 4). Similar to the approach taken for the salary growth
moderator, the relation between turnover and promotions was then estimated separately
through proportional hazards regressions for each performance category. As Table 5 indicates,
the relation between promotions and turnover is positive and significant at four of the five lowest
performance categories, but is never different from zero for the higher performers. That is,
turnover decisions of low performers depend more strongly on promotions than do turnover
decisions of high performers, providing support for H4.
To better illustrate how promotions moderated the performance-turnov r relation, we
computed survival probabilities for high promotions (one standard deviation above the mean),
mean level, and low promotions (set at zero, which was .93 of one standard deviation below the
mean) throughout the performance range (see Figure 4). As anticipated, at the higher levels of
performance promotions appear to make little difference in turnover decisions. However, as the
more pronounced curvilinearity in the high promotions condition implies, the effect of promotions
is greater at lower performance levels. Thus, as hypothesized, lower performers' turnover
probabilities are more strongly positively influenced by promotions than are those of higher
performers. Presumably, this effect is due to the relatively greater need of lower performers to
exhibit visible indications of competence to the external market.
Figure 4. Survival probability by average performance rating and promotions.
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The fifth hypothesis, that performance and labor market conditions interact to determine
turnover, was tested by examining the relation between hazard rates and labor demand over six
years as a function of performance category. The staggered hire years in our sample allowed us
to examine the turnover of employees of equal tenure facing varied labor market environments.
These tests were performed according to performance level. Sample size of only six
notwithstanding, we did find positive, statistically significant correlations between labor demand
and turnover occurring among employees in the two lowest performance categories (see Table
6). None of the correlations for the high performance categories were significantly different from
zero. In other words, labor demand influenced turnover of low performers more strongly than
turnover of high performers, supporting H5.
Table 6: Correlation between Hazard Rate and Labor Demand for Average Performance
Rating Categories
                                                                                                                                    
Correlation of Hazard
Rate and Labor Demand
                                                                                                                                    
All Performance Categories .465
Average Performance = 1.0 .887**
Average Performance = 1.5 .755*
Average Performance = 2.0 -.507
Average Performance = 2.5 -.747*
Average Performance = 3.0 .414
Average Performance = 3.5 .018
Average Performance = 4.0 .699
Average Performance = 4.5 .204
Average Performance = 5.0 -.265
                                                                                                                                    
Note. Statistical tests of correlations are based on sample sizes of six. The sample sizes for
estimating the hazard rates within each performance category are based on samples ranging
from 22 to 1,643 employees.
*p < .05   **p < .01, one-tailed test
Because the results in Table 6 are based solely on a tenure level of one, we also
performed a graphical analysis which collapsed hazard rates across multiple tenure levels. For
potential turnover years with high labor demand and with low labor demand, we compared the
hazard rates of average performance rating category 1 (low performers) with those of combined
categories 4.5 and 5.0 (high performers). The two top categories were combined because only
23 employees were in category 5, resulting in unreliable hazard rate estimates as the category
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is broken down by hire year and tenure. To further improve the reliability of the estimates, we
averaged hazard rates across three tenure levels (years one, two, and three) and two potential
years of turnover in both the high and low labor demand conditions.
Years 1986 and 1987 were the two lowest labor demand years in the study, while 1988
and 1989 were the two highest. Hence, we created an average hazard rate representing
potential turnover in 1986 or 1987 after one, two, or three years of tenure (low demand
condition) and a similar average for potential turnover in 1988 or 1989 (high demand condition).
This was done for both low and high performers. In support of HS and the Table 6 correlations
reported for one year of tenure, Figure 5 clearly indicates that turnover was more strongly
related to labor demand for low performers than for high performers.
Figure 5. Average proportional hazard rate estimates by labor demand and job performance.
Utility Analysis
The previous results suggest that pay policies that provide greater pay growth for high
performers (and less for low performers), though perhaps more costly, might retain more high
performers, encourage separation among low performers, and thus increase the value of the
work force. In order to investigate the economic practicality of implementing such a policy, we
conducted a utility analysis to estimate the relative dollar values of three pay strategies,
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calculated by subtracting service and movement costs from service value over a four year
period. We created a hypothetical 1989 cohort, based on empirical data, in order to track, over
four years, the effects of the three pay strategies. This cohort's performance distribution, and
the 1989 and 1993 average pay levels by performance category and, for 1993 pay, by pay
strategy, are depicted in Table 7. (See the Appendix for details on the cohort construction and
its average pay estimates.)
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Table 7
Employee Distribution and Estimated Average Salaries bar Performance Level
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Performance 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 All
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Employees (1989) 48 78 946 881 1,347 543 256 37 19 4,155
1989 Average Pay $28,490 $29,473 $32,194  $37,437 $39,864 $43,561 $46,385 $41,041 $43,058
1993 Average Pay $30,124     $32,105   $37,882    $45,861     $48,404     $53,897    $57,677     $51,326$54,462
(Strategy 1)
1993 Average Pay $30,124     $32,105     $37,882  $45,861     $48,404   $53,897     $64,393$57,034 $62,982
(Strategy 2)
1993 Average Pay     $23,476     $26,529    $37,882    $45,861      $48,404     $53,897    $64,393$57,034 $62,982
(Strategy 3)
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Separation/retention patterns.  The four year survival probabilities computed earlier for
each performance category under low, mean, and high pay growth were applied to three
different pay strategies in order to estimate separation and retention patterns. As described
earlier, Strategy 1 employed mean pay growth at all performance levels, while Strategies 2 and
3 employed high pay growth in pay levels 4 through 5, with Strategy 3 also employing low pay
growth for performance levels 1 and 1.5. The resultant distributions of survival probabilities
across the three pay strategies are presented in Table 8. To estimate the number of separations
and retentions in each performance category, after four years of each pay strategy, the
appropriate survival probability was multiplied by the number of employees in that performance
category in 1989, shown in the second row of Table 8. The different pay strategies significantly
altered the retention and separation patterns for the affected performance categories (i.e.,
performance rating categories 4, 4.5, and 5 for Strategies 2 and 3; performance rating
categories 1 and 1.5 for Strategy 3). It was assumed that replacements would be hired for each
separating employee (i.e., constant employment levels).
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Table 8
Estimated Four Year Separation Patterns and Movement Costs under Different P4Y Strategies
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Movement
Performance 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 All Cost
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
Employees (1989) 48 78 946 881 1,347 543 256 37 19 4,155
Survival Probabilities*
      Low Pay Growth .03 .42 .32 .59 .44 .60 .27 .07 .00
      Avg Pay Growth .11 .63 .58 .81 .79 .84 .77 .80 .34
      High Pay Growth .26 .78 .77 .92 .93 .94 .95 .98 .88
Survival Probabilities*
      Strategy 1 .11 .63 .58 .81 .79 .84 .77 .80 .34
      Strategy 2 .11 .63 .58 .81 .79 .84 .95 .98 .88
      Strategy 3 .03 .42 .58 .81 .79 .84 .95 .98 .88
Retained Employees (1993)
      Strategy 1 5 49 549 714 1,064 456 197 30 6 3,070
      Strategy 2 5 49 549 714 1,064 456 243 36 17 3,133
      Strategy 3 1 33 549 714 1,064 456 243 36 17 3,113
Replaced Employees (1990-1992)
      Strategy 1 43 29 397 167 283 87 59 7 13        1,085 $69.40M
      Strategy 3 43 29 397 167 283 87 13 1 2 1,022 $65.37M
      Strategy 3 47 45 397 167 283 87 13 1 2 1,042 $66.65M
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Note: Average cost per movement is estimated at $63,960, as discussed in the Appendix.
*Survival probabilities for Strategies 1, 2, and 3 represent average pay growth survival probabilities except that Strategies 2 and 3
differ by representing high pay growth in performance categories 4-5 and Strategy 3 also represents low pay growth for performance
categories 1-1.5.
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Movement costs.  Costs of accommodating separations and replacements were
assumed to be a linear function of the number of separations/replacements. Because the
number of separations and replacements is assumed to be equal for this analysis, we combined
separation and replacement costs, and refer to them simply as "movement costs." An empirical
estimate of movement costs for this particular organization was not available, so they were
estimated to be 1.5 times the average salary of the work force in the year of the movement
(Cascio, 1991, p. 19), which we calculated to be $63,960. (See the Appendix for details of the
calculation.) Total separation/acquisition costs for each pay strategy over the four-year period
were calculated by multiplying the number of separation s/retentions by this estimated
movement cost. Thus, total separation costs were $69.40 million, $65.37 million, and $66.65
million for Strategies 1, 2, and 3, respectively, as listed in the last column of Table 8.
Service costs. Service costs reflect the total ongoing costs required to retain and
support the work force, such as pay and benefits (Boudreau & Berger, 1985). Thus, service
costs vary with pay strategies because base pay varies, as do pay-related expenses. Therefore,
we first calculated the service costs that would have existed in the 1989 and 1993 work force
under each pay strategy, and then assumed linear increases in service costs between 1989 and
1993 to estimate the total service costs incurred under each strategy during the four-year
period. We calculated service costs as salary cost plus benefits, which were assumed to
average 35% of salary. This may underestimate total service costs, which would also include
training costs and administrative costs supporting the employment relationship, but these latter
costs are unlikely to vary with pay strategies, so comparisons between pay strategies are
unlikely to be substantively affected. Service costs were calculated differently for those who
were retained versus those who were replaced (Boudreau & Berger, 1985), because retained
employees carry the effects of prior pay strategies, while the quality and salary of employees
hired after 1988 was assumed to be equal to the average of the work force in the year they were
hired. Total service costs for Strategies 1, 2, and 3 were $981.68 million, $990.37 million, and
990.77 million, respectively. (See the Appendix for details of service costs calculations.)
Comparison of pay strategies based on total costs.  Total service and movement
costs are $1,051.08 million, $1,055.74 million and $1,057.42 million for Strategies 1, 2, and 3,
respectively. This pattern of movement and service costs is intuitive. Compared to Strategy 1,
which gives all employees average pay increases, Strategies 2 and 3 both pay high-performers
more and reduce high-performer separations, increasing service cost. Strategy 3 has higher
service costs because low-paid performers are replaced with higher-paid average performers.
As is evident in Table 8, movement costs are highest for Strategy 1, lowest for Strategy 2, which
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retains more high performers, and somewhat higher for Strategy 3, which induces more low
performers to leave. It is likely that separation rates or costs might be most visible to
organizations, favoring Strategy 2. If both movement costs and service costs were apparent, the
total cost figures favor Strategy 1 rather significantly (up to six million dollars in four-year cost
savings).
Service value.  While informative, the cost analysis certainly is not the complete story.
Just as changes in the performance distribution affect service costs, they also result in changes
in work force value, which is related to movement patterns through the quality of the acquired
and retained employees (Boudreau & Berger, 1985; Boudreau, 1991, Milkovich & Boudreau,
1994).  We need to estimate the dollar value of changes in the performance distribution and
subsequent changes in the value of the work force in order to fully understand the implications
of different pay strategies. Our data provide estimates of changes in the performance rating
distribution, so a conversion method is required to estimate the dollar value of particular
performance levels. This conversion method requires two components (Boudreau & Berger,
1985) -- the value of the average performance level and the incremental value of deviations
from that average performance level. To estimate the first component, we employed the
approach of Schmidt and Hunter (1983), which suggested that the value of the average
performance level would be 1.754 times the average wage at that level. For the second
component, the standard deviation of dollar-va ued performance (SDy), we investigated three
different values: 20% of average salary, which is a very conservative estimate; 40% of average
salary, which is also conservative (Boudreau, 1991); and a more realistic 100% of average
salary (see Appendix). Table 9 reveals that the four-year stream of service value levels grow
higher as pay growth is more strongly linked to performance. The difference in four-year service
value ranges from $4.3 million when SDy is assumed equal to 20% of average salary, to $21.5
million when SDy is assumed equal to 100% of average salary. (See the Appendix for the
rationale behind our assumptions regarding both components and for their application in
calculating service value.)
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Table 9
Computation of Four Year Investment Value of Different Pay Strategies*
                                                                                                                                    
Pay Strategy        Service Value  Service Costs      Movement Costs       Four Year Value
                                                                                                                                    
SDy = 20%
Strategy 1 $1,287.54      $981.68 $69.40 $236.47
Strategy 2 $1,290.88      $990.37 $65.37 $235.14
Strategy 3 $1,291.83      $990.77 $66.65 $234.42
SDy = 40%
Strategy 1 $1,299.63      $981.68 $69.40 $248.56
Strategy 2 $1,306.29      $990.37 $65.37 $250.56
Strategy 3 $1,308.21      $990.77 $66.65 $250.79
SDy = 100%
Strategy 1 $1,335.88      $981.68 $69.40 $284.81
Strategy 2 $1,352.54      $990.37 $65.37 $296.80
Strategy 3 $1,357.32      $990.77 $66.65 $299.91
                                                                                                                                    
*Values are in millions of dollars.
Combined cost and value: The payoff from performance-linked pay growth.  We
have estimated the three components for this decision: (1) the four-year stream of movement
costs, (2) the four-year stream of service costs, and (3) the four-year stream of service value.
Now, we combine them to estimate the relative value of the three pay strategies, by taking the
stream of service value and subtracting the stream of service costs and movement costs
(Boudreau & Berger, 1985). The relevant figures are summarized in Table 9, for each strategy
and SDy assumption
These results suggest a different conclusion from the cost analysis presented earlier.
Strategy 1, which appeared optimal based on costs, now appears optimal only if one assumes
that performance differences are relatively low (SDy = 20% of average yearly salary). If SDy is
40% of average yearly salary or the more probable 100% of average salary, Strategy 3
produces the greatest four year value. In the SDy = 100% case, the Strategy 3 advantage is
potentially as high as $15.1 million when compared to Strategy 1. Thus, the utility analysis
results indicate that, for this group of exempt employees, pay for performance at all
performance levels seems to be the more viable pay strategy.
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Discussion
The present findings suggest that the relation between employee performance and
voluntary employee turnover is curvilinear, such that low and high performers exhibit greater
turnover than average performers. Moreover, our results indicate that performance-turnover
research is enhanced not only by allowing for curvilinearity, but also by examining contextual
factors that can moderate this relation. While we found support for hypothesized moderating
effects of promotions and labor demand, perhaps the most important result from this study
concerned the moderating influence of salary growth. We found that failure to pay according to
performance level resulted in sharp increases in turnover probabilities as performance
advanced from average to high levels. Conversely, paying for performance defused this
tendency as high performer turnover probabilities resembled those of average employees.
As further support for the efficacy of reducing high performer turnover by paying for
performance, results of a utility analysis suggest that, under the most realistic assumption of the
dollar value of performance differences, the four year financial benefit to the organization was
substantial. Even under a somewhat more conservative assumption, paying high performers
according to their performance was a superior policy. Moreover, we may have understated the
case for the dollar value implications of pay for performance. Rosenbaum (1979, 1984) and
Forbes and Wertheim (1995) maintain -that early career promotions predict later promotions
and that those not promoted early tend to be eliminated from later competition. Thus, SDy
should increase over time, which, in this study, would result in further advantage for the pay for
performance strategy (see Russell, Colella, and Bobko, 1993, for a discussion of SDy instability
over time). Additionally, in the utility analysis we ignored the potential of pay for performance to
motivate employees to perform better. Such effects on performance obviously would result in an
even larger payoff for the firm.
Although the utility analysis results and related concerns are important, they do not
address two additional and potentially substantial costs, both of which involve high pay growth's
limiting effect on the turnover of the very top performers. When increasing pay growth from a
mean to a high level, the largest retention increase, by far, was exhibited in the top performance
category. Although the relatively low number of employees in this top performance category (n =
23) may prompt questions regarding the importance of their turnover rate, we contend that the
fate of these few is disproportionately important to the organization. Top performers are of value
not only for their present and short term future performance value alone, as estimated in the
utility analysis, but also as the members of the selection pool from which future firm leaders are
chosen. Precisely because there are so few indispensable firm members or "franchise players"
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(e.g., professional basketball's Michael Jordan) that, as individuals, can influence the success of
the entire organization, it is important to maximize selection pool quality in order to increase
future leader quality (on average) and the probability of finding an exceptional leader.
Tomorrow's executive level stars and perhaps even franchise players may be among today's 23
top performers, and their retention, at least in part, appears to be dependent upon paying them
according to their performance.
Moreover, motivational theory indicates that a firm's financial treatment of the few top
performers seems certain to have implications for the motivation and performance of the
remaining employees. Why should these workers strive to perform better when they can see,
either through direct knowledge of top performer pay or through attributions made from top
performer turnover, that such performance improvements will not be sufficiently rewarded?
Indeed, tournament theory, for example, predicts that such a situation (i.e., the perception of a
low payoff for top performance) will result in relatively low motivation and performance among
those with the ability to raise their performance levels. Similar predictions would follow from
expectancy and equity theories.
In sum, retaining talent is a fundamental tenet of compensation strategy and, according
to our data, pay growth commensurate with performance appears to be one effective approach
toward meeting that goal. We argue that the greater labor costs necessary for retention of these
stars would be trivial relative to the opportunity costs associated with their turnover. These
opportunity costs can include the potentially heavy losses associated with: (1) absence of
performance value from departed high performers, as illustrated in the utility analysis; (2) the
possible turnover of future leaders of the organization; and (3) detrimental motivational effects
on the remaining employees.
Another major finding from this study was the evidence of curvilinearity. We found a
curvilinear relationship between job performance and voluntary turnover because we allowed for
its possibility. That is, given our results and the undermined meta-analytic attempts to study
curvilinearity (McEvoy & Cascio, 1987; Williams & Livingstone, 1994), we argue that the time
has passed for methodological approaches that preclude examination of nonlinearity in studies
of job performance and turnover. Growing evidence of a negative linear effect of performance
on turnover should be interpreted in light of the knowledge that in the vast majority of cases,
curvilinearity was not sought out. As our results attest, curvilinearity and negative linearity are
not mutually exclusive.
Promotions were found to be a significant moderator in that they facilitated low
performer turnover. If promotions have this effect via visible indications of competence, two
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issues warrant notation. First, while we would not advocate that organizations should attempt to
elicit functional turnover by showering their poor performers with meaningless (i.e., unrelated to
monetary rewards) promotions, related questions come to mind. For instance, if training, job
rotation or skill based pay result in relatively concrete credentials for the employee, might these
programs be vehicles that provide ancillary benefits to the organization by enhancing low
performer ease of movement and subsequent turnover while having little effect on high
performer turnover?
A second matter revolves around the lack of a promotions effect for high performers.
Should this result generalize, it bodes well for flatter organizations, where one fear is that
promotional bottlenecks will precipitate high performer turnover. The inference from our results
is that this should not be a problem, as long as those that perform well are paid accordingly. On
the other hand, this uncoupling of promotions and pay growth may well yield high performer
turnover if promotions are given without being accompanied by appropriate salary increases
(Johnston, Griffeth, Burton, & Carson, 1993).
It does seem that promotions serve as a means to an end for both high and low
performers. For the stars, promotions are important to the extent they are tied to pay growth.
For the low performers, promotions simply help one to be taken seriously on the job market. For
the organization, promotions may not facilitate the expected increases in high performer
retention unless they are tied to high salary growth, but they may provide an unexpected benefit
through low performer turnover.
In terms of labor market condition, we found that the labor market influenced low
performer turnover more than high performer turnover. Beginning to address what Williams and
Livingstone (1994: 289) cited as the "need for research that assesses the construct validity of
the different objective measures of unemployment," we utilized labor demand rather than
unemployment rate as the measure of labor market condition. Thus, we may have found a result
where Williams and Livingstone did not because our labor demand measure may have been a
more sensitive indicator of the labor market than their data permitted them to employ. A second
possible reason for the different results is that our sample appeared to have higher level
employees on average. Our low performing subjects, more so than those in the Williams and
Livingstone meta- nalysis, may have been able to generate a larger number and better quality
of performance indicators observable to organizations in the external market.
From a theoretical perspective, the results of this study have several applications. The
finding of curvilinearity supports Jackofsky's (1984) hypothesis. Moreover, our contextual
approach allows for certain inferences regarding the turnover determinants first set forth by
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March and Simon (1958). Jackofsky's implicit assumption that high performers' ease of
movement will not be offset by lower movement desirability appeared to hold true only when pay
and performance were not linked. When pay and performance were strongly linked, the finding
that turnover was approximately equal for top and average performers (Figure 3 indicates little
change between performance levels 2.5 and 5.0) suggests that the high movement ease
enjoyed by high performers is negated by low movement desirability. Also, low performer ease
of movement seemed to be positively affected by labor demand. However, in the present study
it was not possible to differentiate between actual and perceived ease of movement for turnover
attributions. Additionally, we speculate that, with salary growth effects removed, promotions may
still have created somewhat lower movement desirability due to unmeasured elements such as
challenge, positive reinforcement, and relief of boredom. However, our findings suggest that any
promotion driven decreases in movement desirability for low performers were overcome by
increases in actual and or perceived ease of movement.
Despite the overall support we found for Jackofsky's (1984) model, our results also
indicate that moderating influences that operate on ease and desirability of movement have the
potential to substantially enhance or reduce the curvilinear relation, particularly when the values
are extreme. Such results may explain the earlier research that failed to find performance-
turnover curvilinearity but reported a virtual lack of reward contingency (Wright & Bonett, 1993)
and unusually high labor market demand (Birnbaum & Summers, 1993). A more flexible
approach to Jackofsky's framework that easily accommodates such contextual influences might
explain different degrees of and even the absence of curvilinearity. This study indicates that
such a derivative model will need to more fully address the impact of different levels of
moderators on perceived and actual ease and desirability of movement.
This study contributes to the hopeful emergence of a stream in turnover research which
recognizes the importance of identifying and examining new moderators of the performance-
turnover relation. While our main contribution is the pay for performance finding, certainly labor
demand and promotions moderators are of practical interest as well. As opposed to the internal
pay equity which was the focus here, external equity might also moderate performance and
turnover. Indeed, Schwab (1991) in part attributed a positive relation between performance and
turnover for tenured university faculty members to the higher pay level available in the external
market. More broadly, a potential moderator worthy of study is the human resource system as a
whole (e.g., Arthur, 1994). These systems incorporate a variety of policies and programs (e.g.,
compensation and benefits, training, staffing, dispute resolution) that could interact with
performance in a number of different ways. Finally, macro-level rganizational variables should
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also be investigated. Accordingly, Sheridan (1992) found a significant interaction between
organizational culture and performance in the investigation of turnover. Other possible macro-
level moderators include diversification, industry, and downsizing.
In addition to the theoretical and empirical issues addressed above, several other points
are of interest. The present findings may understate the potential effects of the reward system
on turnover among high performers in other settings. The petroleum industry is known as a high
pay level industry. For example, Hay Group (1986) reported that the petroleum industry paid its
middle managers 18% above the all-industry average. Given this high pay level, it is possible
that high performing employees placed less emphasis on internal comparisons than they might
have in an organization where average pay was lower. In the latter organizations, high
performers would perhaps be more likely to experience inequity, based on both internal
comparisons and external comparisons with the relevant external market. The result in such
cases could be even higher relative turnover among high performers.
The influence of labor market conditions may have also been related to factors
somewhat specific to the petroleum industry. Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data, total
employment in the United States grew approximately 20% over the 1983 to 1989 period. In
contrast, combined employment in the petroleum and chemicals industries decreasedby
approximately 28%. Thus, during the period studied, the general level of alternative job
opportunities was small for those employees staying within the petroleum and chemicals
industries. It is difficult to know what effects the low labor market demand might have had on the
results of the present study. For example, pressure on low performers to leave "voluntarily" may
have been higher than usual. On the other hand, based on the finding that turnover among high
performers is relatively independent of labor market conditions, there may have been little
impact on the results for higher performers.
Future research using data from multiple organizations would permit an examination of
whether firm differences in the performance contingency of pay correspond to differences in the
performance levels of leavers. Earlier research (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990) clearly
demonstrates that organization pay strategies differ significantly, particularly in terms of how pay
is delivered (e.g., relative emphasis on base and bonus pay). Thus, it seems likely that
pay-performance relations may similarly differ. It would be useful to see if the key implication of
the present study, that weaker pay for performance relations increase turnover among high
performers, could be replicated using that type of multiple organization data set. Moreover, such
a sample could provide a confirmatory test of curvilinearity in general, and moderated
curvilinearity in particular.
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Appendix
Utility Analysis Assumptions and Calculations
Hypothetical 1989 Cohort
Our data contained information on the 5,143 employees who were hired between 1983
and 1988. Table 7 indicates the number of employees present at the beginning of 1989
(N=4,155), representing the addition of the 3,635 stayers to the 520 employees that voluntarily
or involuntarily separated in 1989. Thus, our simulated analysis applies to a hypothetical group
of 4,155 employees with six or less years of tenure with this firm (i.e., pre-1983 hires were not
included in the data). To estimate the distribution of this group across the performance
categories, we multiplied the original sample observations in each performance category by the
ratio 4,155/5,143, or.808. This approach was driven by the assumption that the most reliable
performance distribution would be based upon our entire sample. The resulting employee
performance distribution is exhibited in Table 7 and formed the basis of our simulation.
The second row of Table 7 lists the estimated average 1989 pay levels by performance
category. These averages were calculated as the mean observed salary in each performance
category, across the entire sample period (1983 to 1988), adjusted for inflation to 1989 dollars.
Once again, applying entire sample data to the hypothetical 1989 work force was undertaken to
utilize the most reliable estimates of, in this case, average salary. The final three rows of Table
7 contain the estimated 1993 salary levels, under each of three pay strategies. For each
performance category, "high (low) pay growth" was defined as a series of four pay increases
equal to one standard deviation higher (lower) than the average for the pay category. Thus, for
each performance category, four times the appropriate yearly pay growth level was added to the
1989 salary level. For example, to calculate the 1993 salary level for those in performance
category 5 under Strategy 2 or Strategy 3, we took the observed average yearly salary increase
for category-5 performers ($2,851), and added the yearly salary increase value equal to one
standard deviation for category-5 performers ($2,130), multiplied the result by four, and added
that to the estimated 1989 salary level.
Movement Costs
We assumed that movement costs would not vary with pay strategy, so we estimated
average salary assuming average pay growth for all performance categories (Strategy 1). Thus,
average cost per movement in 1989 was estimated to be 1.5 times the average 1989 salary
level of $38,187, and average cost per movement in 1993 was estimated to be $47,092, which
is 1.5 times the average 1993 salary of the employees retained between 1989 and 1993,
assuming that salary increases were given for the four-year period. Because we assumed that
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movement costs increased linearly between 1989 and 1993, the average cost per movement
over the four-year period was thus estimated to be $63,960 (i.e., 1.5 times the midpoint between
the 1989 and 1993 average salary levels). This is a simplified version of the Boudreau and
Berger (1985) cost calculation, which separated acquisition and separation costs, and allowed
for variations over time and strategies. Because analyzing different selection or retention
activities was not the object of this analysis, we combined the two costs and used an average
level.
Service Costs
Retained-employee service costs in 1993. For employees retained throughout the four-
year analysis, we determined the 1993 salary level for each performance category at the end of
the four-year period, under each pay strategy (see Table 7). Then, we multiplied this salary level
by 1.35 to reflect total service costs, and then multiplied each service cost estimate in each
performance category by the projected number of retained employees in each performance
category under each pay strategy (see Table 8) to obtain the total 1993 service costs for
retained employees in each performance category. These products were summed across
performance categories to give an overall estimate of the 1993 service costs for those retained
from the 1989 work force.
Replacement-employee service costs in 1993. To calculate 1993 service costs for the
replacements, we assumed that under all pay strategies, replacements would have been of
average quality, and paid the salary level that would have existed if average pay increases had
been given over the four-year period (Strategy 1). This was calculated by multiplying the
number of retained employees under Strategy 1 in each performance category (see Table 8) by
the corresponding 1993 salary level assuming average salary increases (Strategy 1 in Table 7),
adding the products and dividing by the number of retained employees. The resulting average
1993 salary level was $47,092, as noted earlier. This value was multiplied by 1.35 to estimate
the average 1993 annual service cost for each replacement as $63,575. To calculate the total
1993 service costs for replacements hired during the four-y ar analysis, we multiplied $63,575
by the number of replacements in the 1993 work force under each pay strategy.
Total service costs. 1993 and 1989.  To estimate the 1989 service costs levels, we
multiplied the average 1989 salary level by 1.35, and multiplied this figure by the total number of
employees in the work force in 1989 (see Tables 7 and 8), producing a total service cost value
of $214.20 million in 1989. To calculate the total 1993 service-cost level we added the service
costs for stayers and replacements, using the performance distributions and salary levels from
Tables 7 and 8 for the retained employees, and the average service cost for the replacements,
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under each pay strategy. Under all strategies there is at least a 23% increase in service costs
over the four years, commensurate with increasing pay levels over time. However, Strategies 2
and 3 produce somewhat higher 1993 service cost levels because Strategy 2 retains more high
performers, and Strategy 3 also replaces some low performers with average performers.
Four-year service costs. To calculate the four-year stream of service costs, we assumed
that service costs increased linearly between 1989 and 1993. Thus, one-quarter of the
difference between the 1993 and 1989 service costs levels was assumed to have accrued in
each intervening year. For example, for Strategy 1, the service costs levels in years 1989
through 1992 would be: $226.69 million, $239.18 million, $251.66 million, and $264.15 million,
respectively. Hence, the total stream of service costs under Strategy 1 is the sum of these four
values, or $981.68 million. The corresponding values for Strategies 2 and 3 were $990.37
million and $990.77 million (see Table 9).
Service Value
Dollar value of average performance. There is no single accepted method of estimating
the dollar value of average performance among workers or applicants. Some research has
suggested that average performance value can be estimated equal to the average
compensation of the work group, as in the CREPID method, where an average rating across all
dimensions will produce an dollar-v lued performance estimate equal to the average wage
(Boudreau, 1991, p. 654). Raju, Burke and Normand (1990, p. 9) propose a similar position.
However, it seems unlikely that average-performing employees produce only enough value to
offset their direct wage costs. Considering the other service costs that are incurred, and the
need for organizations to obtain a positive return on costs, a higher level of average service
value seems likely. Thus, Schmidt and Hunter (1983) proposed assuming that the ratio of
average wage to average dollar value is approximately .57, based on an analysis of wage and
productivity estimates in the national income accounts of the United States. The reciprocal of
.57 is 1.754, suggesting that the value of average performance would be 1.754 times the
average wage.
Theory and evidence are quite sparse regarding this issue. Fortunately for our analysis,
different assumptions about average service value affect the estimated total value of the work
force, but the relative work force value under different pay strategies is not affected. These
relative values are the key to comparing pay strategy decisions. Therefore, we will use the
estimate of average service value as 1.754 times average wage, following the logic of Schmidt
and Hunter (1983). For the 1989 work force, we multiplied the average salary by 1.754 to obtain
a value of $66,995 per person, per year. For the 1993 work force, consistent with the estimate
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of average service costs above, we estimated average salary as that which would have been
produced by four years of average salary increases, beginning in 1989. Thus, as noted above,
average 1993 salary was estimated to be $47,092 producing an average work force value
estimate of 1.754 times $47,092, or $82,600 per person, per year.
Dollar value of performance rating categories. W  required an estimate of the value of
each of the nine performance levels, in both 1989 and 1993, so that as the distribution of
employees across performance levels changes, the dollar implications can be assessed. This
was different from prior utility analysis applications, which estimated the value of changes in
average work force quality, such as the increased average value of a better-selec ed or better
trained group (Boudreau, 1991). This did not require or produce estimates of the dollar value of
particular performance levels, nor the distribution of employees among those levels.
Still, some SDy estimation methods can produce dollar-value estimates of different
performance levels. For example, CREPID assigns dollar values to different performance
dimensions according to their importance, rates each employee on a scale of 0 to 2 on each
dimension, multiplies the resulting ratings by the dollar values, and adds the results to create a
dollar-valued performance estimate for each employee (Boudreau, 1991; Cascio, 1994). Raju,
Burke and Normand (1990, Appendix B) proposed an My estimation method that uses
managerial judgments to determine the relative value of the highest and lowest performance
rating level, estimates the dollar value of average performance, and then mathematically derives
an SDy value based on the observed distribution of performance level. In this study, we had no
direct estimates of the dollar value of particular performance levels, as is probably typical of
many organizational situations. Thus, we used an estimation approach that does not require
such estimates, but it is consistent with both CREPID and RBN. The method consisted of three
steps, each applied to the work force of 1989 and 1993.
First, we estimated the standard deviation of dollar-valued performance (service value), SDy,
based on a percentage of salary. As Boudreau (1991) noted, across a large number of studies,
40% of salary proved to be a conservative estimate, compared to estimates derived using other
methods. However, in actual situations, the value of SDy is unlikely to be estimated precisely,
so we investigated three values: as an extremely conservative approach, we used 20% of
average salary; we used 40% of average salary as a conservative estimate; and we used 100%
of average salary as a more realistic estimate. Support of the 100% approach is provided by
Becker and Huselid (1992), who found direct observations of SDy fell in the 74% to 100% of
mean salary range. Their study examined retail sales jobs, which would seem to be of less
complexity, and thus lower SDy values (Hunter, Schmidt, & Judiesch, 1990), than the exempt
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jobs in our sample. For 1989, we estimated average salary as $38,187, producing SDy
estimates of $7,637, $15,275 and $38,187 for the 20%, 40% and 100% levels, respectively. For
1993, estimated average salary was $47,092, producing three corresponding estimated SDy
levels of $9,418, $18,837, and $47,092.
Second, we estimated the Z-score corresponding to each of the nine performance
ratings, using the observed distribution of employees across performance categories. The
average performance rating was 2.76, with a standard deviation of .66. We assumed that the
Z-scores for the underlying performance distribution would be the same from 1989 to 1993,
because the underlying value function changes only with the job activities, which we assumed
were constant. Thus, although the distribution of workers across performance categories
changes from 1989 to 1993, we assumed that the relative standardized value of different
performance levels did not change. This produced the Z-scores corresponding to each
performance rating. Finally, multiplying these Z-scores by the appropriate dollar value of a one
standard deviation performance difference in 1989 and 1993 produced the dollar values
corresponding to each performance rating level, for each My assumption.
The dollar values are more varied as SDy increases. Also, the 1993 values are larger
and more varied than 1989 levels, due to the increased average work force value and average
salary, which increases SDy levels. Under the largest My assumption, in both 1989 and 1993,
the lowest two performance categories are estimated to actually produce negative service
value, due to the large variability in performance value.
Service value of alternative pay policies, 1989 and 1993. For 1989, the total service
value of the work force was calculated simply by multiplying the performance category service
values by the corresponding quantities of employees in each performance category (see Table
7), and adding the products. For 1993, the total service value of the work force was calculated
separately for those employees retained over the four-year analysis, and for those hired during
the four-year period, similarly to the service-cost calculation earlier. For the retained employees,
the 1989 service values for each SDy level were multiplied by the quantity of retained
employees from Table 8 for each performance category, and these products were summed.
Employees hired during the four-year analysis were assumed to have an average value equal to
the average work force value that would have been produced by giving average pay increases
over the four years. This value was equal to the average 1993 salary times 1.754. This value
was multiplied by the number of replaced employees from Table 8. The service value of the
replacements and retained employees was added to produce the estimated total 1993 service
value for each pay strategy, and each assumed SDy level, as shown in Table 9.
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Under all assumptions about SDy, the 1993 yearly service value is lowest when giving
all employees average pay increases (Strategy 1), higher when giving high performers high pay
increases and all others average increases (Strategy 2), and highest when giving high
performers high pay increases, middle performers average pay increases and low performers
low pay increases (Strategy 3). This is because, compared to giving all employees average pay
increases, Strategy 2 causes more high-performing and highly-paid employees to stay, and their
value enhances the work force. Strategy 3 has the same effect on high performers, but it also
induces lower performers to leave more frequently, and they are replaced by average
performers, producing an additional increment in low-performer service value. Greater SDy
levels increase the magnitude of the differences. Yet, even with SDy estimated to be only 20%
of average salary, the organization obtains a one-year 1993 service value increase of over $1.7
million dollars by adopting the more aggressive pay-for-performance strategy, as opposed to the
average growth policy.
Four-year service value. As with service costs, we calculated the four-year stream of
service value levels under each pay strategy and each assumed SDy level by assuming that
total service value rose linearly between 1989 and 1993, so that one-quarter of the change in
service value accrued in each intervening year. Summing these stream of service value levels
for each pay strategy and each assumed SDy level produced the values shown in Table 9.
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Footnotes
1 Gerhart and Milkovich (1989), for example, in a sample of managerial and professional
employees, found that performance was less closely linked to promotions than to overall pay
growth.
2 Of course, the Boudreau and Berger (1985) model in its purest form would calculate
the work force value in each intervening year and apply a discount factor to equalize the time
value of the dollar amounts. However, such embellishments would not have a significant effect
in this case because the changes in dollar amounts are assumed to be linear, the time frame is
relatively short, and our focus is on the relative (versus absolute) value of the different
strategies. We also did not have information about the organizational tax rate, so we report our
results in pre-tax dollars. After-tax effects could be easily calculated by multiplying the final
results by an appropriate after-tax proportion, but the relative effects of the options would not be
altered.
3 By using the actual average pay growth for each performance category, we mirrored
the organization's past practice in Strategy 1, while Strategies 2 and 3 implemented high and
low pay growth based on within-performance-category pay growth means and standard
deviations. This approach assumes managerial decisions are made to improve or worsen pay
growth relative to historical practices at certain performance levels. Although this assumption
has a foundation in anecdotal evidence and in equity theory (i.e., one's own inputs and
outcomes at a recent time as the relevant comparison), the notion of pay for performance could
easily be interpreted as necessitating the computation of low, average, and high pay growth
means and standard deviations across performance categories. Accordingly, we reran the utility
analysis with strategies reflecting the following: Strategy 1 - the same percentage increase for
all performance levels; Strategy 2 - a higher percentage increase (plus one standard deviation
in total sample percentage pay growth) for ratings 4, 4.5, and 5; and Strategy 3 - the higher
percentage increase for ratings 4, 4.5, and 5, coupled with a lower percentage increase (minus
one standard deviation in total sample percentage pay growth) for ratings 1 and 1.5. Results did
not substantively differ from those to be reported here.
